

英 語

次の文章を読み、後の設問に答えなさい。

We humans use animals. We eat them, play with them, and wear their skins. Most important, we use them as the subjects of experiments in advancing medical science. Animals of many species — rabbits, dogs, pigs, monkeys, but mice and rats above all — have long been used in scientific research. Such research has led to discoveries that have saved millions of human lives and have contributed to the safety and well-being of hundreds of millions of other lives, animal and human. In experiments aimed at the *discovery* of new drugs or other medicines to promote human health, animal subjects are essential. They are also indispensable in *testing* the safety of drugs and other products to be used by humans. Anesthetized*, the animals serving in this way are seldom caused pain. Some do experience distress, however, and many are killed.

Animals are not stones. They live and they may suffer. Every honest person will agree that treating animals in some ways is inhumane and unjustified. But the good that has been done by medical investigations that could not have been undertaken without animal subjects is so very great as to be beyond calculation; this, also, every honest person must acknowledge. Using animals is an inescapable cost of most successful medical research. Bearing that in mind we ask, Is this use of animals in medicine morally right?

Other uses of animals are common, obviously. Animals give companionship, provide transportation, serve as food and clothing, and so on; and within each kind of use there is an enormous variety of specific uses. For each specific use, as for each kind of use, it may always be asked, *Should* that be done? Is it right? The answer in medical science is very clear. Investigators there *cannot* do without animal subjects. All over the world medical centers and individual scientists rely heavily — and must rely — on the use of animal subjects in testing candidate drugs for safety, searching for new cures, widening and deepening biological knowledge.

Critics argue that medical experiments unjustly violate the rights of animals. I ask, Do animals have rights? This philosophical question lies at the heart of the debate. We cannot avoid it because if animals do have rights, the use of them in medical experiments may have to be given up. I emphasize: It is not the wearing of furs that is our chief concern here, or hunting for sport, or even the eating of meat. It is the use of animals in medical research, above all other uses, that compels us to think carefully about the moral status of animals.

Whether animals do have rights may be a provocative question, but is it of practical importance? Is it more than an exercise in theoretical dispute? The animal rights debate, some might say, is a set of quarrels so academic, so “philosophical,” that it does not really concern most ordinary folks. After all, great industries and tens of thousands of jobs depend on animal use. Hundreds of millions of humans rely on animals as their food. Most humans in the world consume dairy products and fish and meat every day or every week; we wear leather shoes and wool clothing; we visit zoos and love our pets, and so on and on. Why take this “animal rights debate” seriously? Human reliance on animals is so widespread, so deep and complete, that there would seem to be little point in asking⁽¹⁾ whether animals have rights.

We have, in fact, very good reason to ask and answer that question. The morality of animal use is indeed a *philosophical* issue, but by no means is it merely theoretical. My position adopted regarding the supposed rights of animals will have a direct significance for community policy and for the life of each of us.

The practical force of philosophical questions about animal rights is this: If what we (individually or as a society) are doing with animals is not morally justifiable, we ought to stop doing it, and we ought to seek to keep others from doing it. If animals really do have rights, those rights deserve protection. Laws may be adopted that forbid conduct that is now nearly universal. Such laws may prove exceedingly inconvenient and very costly. But neither inconvenience nor cost can excuse us from fulfilling our obligations. The controversy over the use of animals is therefore intensely practical.

I hold that most uses of animals in medical science, including some that result in the deaths of many animals, are fully justifiable. This position is very widely shared by ordinary folks. Defending this conclusion, formulating and explaining it, is a much-needed step in responding to emotional attacks on what animal rights defenders like to refer to as “vivisection*.” Those attacks by “animal rights” activists are deeply and dangerously mistaken. Exposing and explaining their mistakes is an enterprise at once important and humane.

Animals do not have rights. This is not to say that we may do whatever we please to animals or that everything commonly done by humans to animals is justifiable. Not at all. It is morally right to use animals in medical research, but from this it does not follow that any use of them is right. Of course not. We humans have a universal obligation to act *humanely*, and this means that we must refrain from treating animals in ways that cause them unnecessary distress. Animals are not lumps of clay, and they ought not to be dealt with as though they feel no pain.

Defenders of animals, however, often demand regulations that would do very much more than enforce humane and thoughtful care. These critics object to any use of animals. They aim to bring to an end all uses of animals, most certainly including all experiments in which animals are subjects. They seek, in their own words, “not larger cages, but empty cages.” Such persons describe themselves, with respect to animal experimentation, as *abolitionists**. The growing popularity of this abolitionist position, and the danger of it, oblige us to reexamine here the arguments for and against the use of animals in medical science.

Two branches of the abolitionist family must be distinguished. Both adopt as a central aim the ending of all animal use, but the underlying moral arguments of the two branches are very different. The phrase “animal rights activists” has been loosely but inaccurately applied to both, resulting in widespread misunderstanding. The appeal to *animal rights* is indeed the heart of one main branch of the abolitionist family, but by those in the other branch no such appeal is made. Allow me to explain.

The current debate about animals was opened by an Australian professor of philosophy, Peter Singer. Experiments using animals, he believes, we are morally obliged to stop, as we are obliged to stop all production of animals for food, because of the horrible cruelties inflicted on helpless and innocent creatures. The benefits we obtain from the use of animals, he argues, are rightly weighed, but they cannot justify the inhumanity our use of them imposes. The animal liberation movement made (and makes) no claims about the rights of animals. Singer says clearly that *consequences* are what count for him. The movement is built on the conviction that, all things considered, animal experimentation does more harm than it does good. The suffering inflicted on animals by medical experiments is so great, say the liberationists, that no consequences those experiments may produce can justify it.

The second branch of the abolitionist family, the animal rights movement (strictly so-called), has a moral foundation that is very different, not concerned with consequences at all. All uses of animals — including medical and scientific uses — are to be condemned because they are *wrong*. To see that they are wrong, we have only to understand the true moral status of animals and then to apply universal moral principles to the human conduct in question. The evil of animal experimentation, for philosophers in this camp, lies not in the supposed excess of bad consequences over good ones. Rather, the use of animals is (for them) essentially immoral; it is conduct that violates, always and inevitably, the *rights* those animals possess. On this account, it does not matter how the advantages and disadvantages of animal experimentation balance out; using animals in science is morally wrong because it violates the rights of conscious beings that we have a compelling moral duty to respect. This branch of the abolitionist family, careful in formulating its claims, does indeed defend the existence and centrality of “animal rights.” I will use the phrase “animal rights defenders” in the strict sense, to identify this second branch of the abolitionist family. *Animal liberation*, on the one hand, and the defense of *animal rights* on the other hand, need to be distinguished.

⁽²⁾ The two camps are often very unhappy with one another. Members of each are distressed by the efforts of the other to advance worthy ends with what are thought to be bad arguments. For the liberationists, whose calculations are of pleasures and pains, moral claims regarding abstract animal rights are mocked as vague and unjustifiable. The “rights” suggested are taken by liberationists to be matters of bitter disagreement, never firmly established. To risk the lives of animals on a foundation so fundamentally insecure, say the liberationists, is to invite disaster. But for the defenders of animal rights in the strict sense, the arguments of the “liberation” camp are not only insecure but dangerous. In some cases, at least, the calculation of good and bad consequences of animal use is virtually certain to yield a result not favorable to the animals. But in such cases the liberationist defense of animals must collapse, resting as it does on the calculation of the worth of consequences. This is an unacceptable result from the standpoint of those who defend animal rights. Animal experimentation, they say, along with the eating of animals and every other disrespectful use of animals, is to be condemned not conditionally but absolutely, not because it does more harm than good but because it is essentially and absolutely *wrong*.

The critical fears of both sides are well-grounded. Abolitionist arguments based on the calculation of goods and evils are indeed mistaken in reckoning the full consequences of animal uses. A simple analysis of the consequences will indeed support the use of animals in science. And abolitionist arguments based on the supposed rights of animals do indeed have a foundation that is unclear and indefensible. Animals, whose welfare we protect, cannot have rights; rights arise in the sphere of human morality and apply to moral agents that are uniquely human.

* (注)

anesthetize	～に麻酔をかける
vivisection	生体解剖
abolitionist	廃止論者

(Carl Cohen and Tom Regan, *The Animal Rights Debate*, 2001 による。)

〔設問〕

- 1 下線部(1)について、筆者はその理由をどのように述べているか。また、「動物に権利があるか」という問いの意味について筆者自身はどのように考えているか。350字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。句読点も1字に数える。

- 2 下線部(2)で言われている two camps とはそれぞれ具体的にどのような立場を指しているか。また、それぞれの立場がお互いにどのような不満をもっているかと書かれているか。350字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。句読点も1字に数える。

- 3 人間はさまざまな目的のために動物を殺してきたし、今でも殺している。例えば、食肉用、衣料用(毛皮のコートなど)、動物実験用、環境保護用(有害獣駆除、生態系保護など)、娯楽・スポーツ用(狐狩りなど)などである。そのことを念頭に置いた上で、捕鯨あるいは闘牛を題材にして、次のア、イ、ウ、エのいずれか一つの立場を選び、それを根拠づける議論を、この問題文の筆者の論述を参考にしながら、700字以内の日本語で展開しなさい。句読点も1字に数える。
なお、ア～エのうち、いずれの立場を選んだか、その記号を所定の欄に記入すること。

- ア 捕鯨は許される。
- イ 捕鯨は許されない。
- ウ 闘牛は許される。
- エ 闘牛は許されない。