

平成19年6月16日(土)13:00~14:30

問題1 次の英文を読み、以下の(1)~(4)の設問に答えなさい。

Compassionate strangers

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The war started suddenly and, within days, hundreds of thousands of refugees crossed the border from Lebanon into the security of Syria looking for safety. Many were supported by Syrian families and lived with them, others took the next plane to the West, and some were housed in converted summer camps of the youth movement in Syria. (A)After a few weeks the war ended, as suddenly as it began, and the refugees returned to what was left of their homes. This is not the accustomed image in the West of refugees where the pictures are those provided by the media, usually images coming from Africa, showing people from already desperately poor countries descending into even worse conditions. The emotional response is immediate - pity, anger, frustration, sadness, and perhaps with a sort of frustrated desire to do something about the situation - a compassionate response.

As Aristotle (1926) put it:

Let compassion then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, an evil which one might expect to come upon oneself or one of one's friends, and when it seems near. For it is evident that one who is likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he, or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil.

(B)Aristotle's definition raises several points. To (ア) the pain implies that the person (イ) capable of feeling the impact of (ウ) evil on the other person. It (エ) means that the experience must be (オ) that is capable of being imagined (カ) something that could impact on oneself (キ) on one's friends. So, can one feel an abstract compassion? Living in an affluent country it is difficult to imagine, never mind experience, hunger, mass displacement through war, or the terror of invasion. It is for most people an abstract feeling, one that is not grounded in the potential reality that Aristotle implies, but in the reality that is created by television journalism with all its in terms of selectivity and bias. Aristotle implies a communality of experience that is foundational for compassion.

Because the strangeness and shock of the initial encounter can become the ordinary, the images of famines and war become commonplace. But, paradoxically, this should mean that compassion increases as more and more people experience the plight of others even vicariously". But again, this assumes that people are capable of experiencing and judging that it is part of the human experience. (C)The reality is that people in the West do not experience these things in that way. It is like the experience of watching a movie. The degree of violence that some people (usually men) can tolerate on screen is quite staggering. But film is not

reality and the pity aroused by film is not compassionate. Rather, it is a proxy feeling. This creates a distance between the observer and the object of her compassion, and this objectification is subject to the process of habituation. As objects become familiar, they fade from view, their salience becomes dulled. In the West, if we see a corpse by the side of the street, we are curious and disturbed. A soldier at war will become accustomed to this and unmoved by the sight, because, of course, he cannot afford to stop and emote at every dead body. If he did, he would simply stop fighting. As Nietzsche pointed out, compassion weakens and should be avoided by the strong.

So, much of the compassion of the West is what some Buddhists call idiot compassion. This is compassion that sees the evil afflicting others as something distinct from the everyday situation of the person feeling compassion. It is a form of degenerate compassion and perhaps more accurately described as pity. Pity is a self-regarding feeling, where the objects of pity are viewed from the secure vantage point of the pitier. The pitier gives some aid\* or watches a Live Aid concert on the television. The truly compassionate have the desire to change the situation - compassion is an intentional state. We cannot have compassion without the desire to alleviate\* the suffering.

This intention to do something entails a whole range of possible responses. These range from perhaps contributing some money, to devoting one's life to the alleviation of suffering, for example, some of the people who enter nursing or medicine. This personal expression of compassion requires certain skills to be effective. It is not enough to hold a refugee's hand, rather it is a question of housing, medical care, food, and education. These skills are usually closely protected professional skills that entail a long training. It is difficult for the compassionate person to therefore do something in a direct way, to change the situation of the object of their compassion.

If a person is compassionate, is this compassion sustainable? Presumably some people will have a lot of it and some will have less: the amount they have will vary. Some can sustain this compassion over a period of time, some cannot. This is not a strange quality if we consider that compassion is intentional. There will be a finite amount of resources that the individual can contribute to alleviating suffering as they also have, as a limiting case, to provide for their own body. If the greatly compassionate give all their resources to the needy, then they become objects of compassion themselves, which seems self-defeating. The judgement, then, is how much resource to devote to compassion? The expression of compassion is something that has to be organized and structured, to optimize\* the impact of the intervention, and also to prevent the slide of the compassionate into that of those who elicit compassion.

So, can one become tired of being compassionate? Compassion fatigue is now a familiar term. Perhaps one has seen so many examples of particular forms of suffering that new examples no longer elicit a particular response. The person has become habituated to this stimulus. Why does this happen? It is clear that for media presented suffering, the

dramatization of events by groups with particular self-interested reasons (the press, certain charities, or non-governmental organisations) can lead to cynicism or suspicion. But to be a compassionate person means that one does not become fatigued. It is difficult to describe a courageous person as someone who gets tired or bored of being brave and turns away from courage. Of course, it is possible for a person to be courageous and then suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In this case, by analogy, compassion fatigue is not boredom but a clinical condition of a disrupted emotional response. This seems to be the definition that seems to be current now: a form of secondary PTSD from identification with the suffering of others. But too much pain and the desire to avoid it seems different from the boredom that comes from too many images. We have compassion fatigue from too much direct contact with suffering or compassion fatigue from too little direct contact.

So, for nursing, where compassion is a foundational quality, there are certain problems. On the one hand, there is an expectation that one would have the virtue of compassion as distinct to the idiot compassion of managerialism\*. For the manager, the outward manifestations of compassion are indicators that can be measured. In a service that attempts to reduce health care to inputs and outputs, there is little contractual space for compassion. On the other hand, compassion, is not just a feeling but an intentional state, and this requires structure and resources to alleviate suffering. For the nurse working with patients, there is the challenge of not becoming a casualty of compassion; of identifying too much with the pain of others and therefore becoming ill or becoming habituated to suffering. Perhaps, what is needed is to recognize compassion as a particularly hard-nosed virtue and to take the advice of Muhammad Yunus, this year's winner of the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on providing credit for the poor, 'it is the system, not your conscience that needs reforming'.

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\*vicariously:身代わりとなって

\*alms:慈善の施し

\*alleviate:軽減する、和らげる

\*optimize:最大限に利用する

\* managerialism:統制主義、管理主義

(1) 下線部(A)を日本語に訳しなさい。

(2) 下線部(B)の(ア)～(キ)にあてはまる単語を以下から選び、記号で答えなさい。  
ただし完全解答の場合にのみ得点を与えます。

(a) also (b) as (c) feel (d) is (e) one (f) or (g) the

(3) 下線部(C)の"these things"や"in that way"の具体的な内容を明記しつつ、下線部(C)を日本語に訳しなさい。

14) pity と compassion の違いを本文に即して説明しなさい。

## 問題 2

### English Essay

The medical profession, with its enormous physical and emotional demands, naturally makes health-care workers vulnerable to compassion fatigue. However, caring for a sick relative, doing volunteer work after a natural disaster or even supporting a classmate, who is being bullied or made fun of, may also lead to compassion fatigue.

Write an essay in English by giving some concrete examples of what you think might cause someone to suffer from compassion fatigue and what they can do to prevent it.